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A B S T R A C T
The ability of powerful incumbent actors to resist technological or institutional changes that threaten their
vested interests is a core part of the literature on sustainable energy transitions, but more often asserted in
general than tested in specific cases. This article presents analysis of a detailed study of the introduction of a
Capacity Market (CM) for electricity in Great Britain in the period 2010–2011, using a process tracing approach.
The study finds evidence to support the view that large electricity generators have a significant degree of
structural power in relation to decision makers, that such companies did lobby the government through the CM
policy process, and that the ideas deployed had an effect on the shape of the CM. However, there were also
divisions amongst the large generating companies on whether they wanted a CM or not, and what its design
should be. We also show that the institutional circumstances of the CM policy process were quite specific, giving
opportunities for lobbying that may not be present in other cases. We conclude it is essential to have an analysis
of incumbent power that is contingent on institutional context, the specific nature of interests and the deploy-
ment of ideas. To counter incumbent power and structural dependency during sustainable energy transforma-
tion, an independent but legitimate body is needed to the direction of policy.
1. Introduction
The ability of large powerful incumbent actors to resist changes that
threaten their vested interests is an important theme in the literature on
sustainable energy transitions. Unruh's pioneering work on ‘carbon
lock-in’ noted the ways in which: ‘constituencies can draw law makers
in by lobbying officials for support and preferential treatment of an
existing technological system.’ ([61]: 825). Within the socio-technical
systems literature, which uses the concept of a socio-technical ‘regime’,
the influence of energy sector incumbents in seeking to slow or prevent
low-carbon1 energy transitions has been framed as ‘regime resistance’
[20].
This view of resistance to change by incumbents in the energy sector
is highly plausible, yet it is much more often asserted in general than
tested in specific cases. This paper focuses in detail on one example: the
introduction and design of a Capacity Market (CM) for electricity in
Great Britain. The CM formed part of a wider set of policies known as
the Electricity Market Reform (EMR), which was intended to lead to
accelerated investment in low-carbon electricity generation in the form
of new nuclear power and renewables. The concern was that a rise in
variable renewables would increase the level and uncertainty of rev-
enue for conventional generation capacity through lower and more
volatile wholesale prices, and that this would deter the investment in
such capacity that would be needed to provide flexibility in a future
system with variable net demand. The CM was intended to address this
concern, by providing a payment to some generating plants or demand
response providers just for being available. It takes the form of an
auction, conducted by a central buyer, into which owners of resources
can bid. Winners are then rewarded with contracts for availability, and
additional payments in case they are called on. To date, auctions have
led to total capacity payments of the order of £3.8 billion, 90 per cent of
which will go to owners of existing power plants.2
A widely held view amongst observers of the energy industry is that
the formulation and design of the CM was heavily influenced by
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lobbying from large powerful companies that own generation assets
[1,3,37]. It is consistent with the idea that large powerful energy
companies in Britain shape energy policy more broadly (e.g. [63]). This
article tests this view. Despite the widespread assumption of the power
and activities of incumbents in lobbying, detailed studies of the process
are relatively rare,3 and this is one of the key contributions of this ar-
ticle.
We take Geels’ [20] concept of ‘regime resistance’ as a starting
point. However, drawing on more detailed research on the influence of
powerful actors in areas such as innovation policy [31] and the fi-
nancial sector [7], we argue that the deployment of structural power in
any one case will depend on how interests are constructed, the in-
stitutional opportunities for influencing policy, and the ideas used by
corporate actors. Examining these factors in the case of the CM thus
involves ‘unpacking’ regime resistance, in order to understand exactly
how, and how far, it has worked.
We find evidence that a number of large generating companies did
influence the CM policy process, and that political incentives for gov-
ernment point to a high degree of structural power for companies,
which can therefore be seen as ‘incumbents’ (we define this term fur-
ther below). However, there are other key aspects of the CM policy
process that are not well-captured in the ‘regime resistance’ approach,
including divisions amongst the large generating companies on whether
they wanted a CM or not, and what its design should be. We also show
that the institutional context for the CM policy process was quite spe-
cific, giving opportunities for lobbying companies that may not be
present in other cases. We conclude that in order to understand the
operation of regime resistance in sustainable energy transitions, it is
essential to have an analysis of incumbent power that is contingent on
the specific nature of interests, institutional context and the particular
ideas deployed in lobbying.
In exploring the Capacity Market case study, we draw on a range of
sources, but two are particularly important: a set of interviews with
individuals who had participated in or were close observers of decision
making in the CM process (see Appendix 1 for details), and consultation
documents published by the government and submissions to those
consultations.
The remainder of the article is organised as follows. In the next two
sections we lay out the analytical framework and the methodological
approach. Section 4 provides context by briefly laying out the context
for the CM. Evidence on the CM policy process is then laid out in
Section 5, with a particular focus on the decision to adopt a mechanism
and on its overall design. In Section 6 we conclude, revisiting the
concept of regime resistance in light of this evidence, and briefly ex-
ploring implications for our understanding of energy transitions and for
the energy policy making process.
2. Theorising ‘regime resistance’
The concept of a ‘regime’ in energy systems is most associated with
the ‘multi-level perspective’ [19,21]. This formulation involves three
different conceptual ‘levels’: ‘niches’, in which new technologies are
developed and nurtured, usually protected from competitive pressures;
‘landscapes’, which provide a set of deep structural trends that provide
an external context, and ‘regimes’. The regime for any technological
system constitutes mainstream ways of realising various social func-
tions, and provides the ‘selection environment’ for new technologies
and other innovations [[55]: 440].
Early formulations of the multi-level perspective were criticised for
paying insufficient attention to power and politics [42,43,52], which
has led to a new literature on politics in socio-technical transitions [35].
In the case of the socio-technical regime, the starting point has been a
focus on the processes by which regime stability is actively maintained
[54], especially by incumbent companies (e.g. [53,24]).
One particularly influential contribution has been provided by Geels
[20], who applies his framework to the British electricity system, which
makes it particularly apposite here. Geels argues that policy makers and
incumbent firms can be seen as forming a ‘core regime level alliance’ (p
27), based on aligned interests that arise out of mutual dependencies.
Companies rely on governments not only for the general institutions of
property rights and rules of exchange, but also for specific interventions
including subsidies and taxes. At the same time, society is system-
atically dependent on economic growth, and so it is rational for gov-
ernments to yield to corporate demands for supportive policies. Others,
such as Wilks [63] and Newell and Paterson [47] argue that this
‘structural dependency’ argument is particularly applicable to the en-
ergy sector.4 Certainly, the powerful political incentive to maintain a
reliable electricity system in a modern economy [27] means that de-
cision makers may be particularly susceptible to discourses of crisis
created by incumbents.5
Geels ([20]: 26–27) goes on to argue that companies in the regime
seek to influence policy makers through a set of ‘relational networks
and close contacts’, with frequent consultation of large companies by
senior officials, and through lobbying, information and more con-
frontational strategies such as legal challenge.6 Their aim is an inter-
nalisation of the interests and ideas of industries by policy makers.
Geels’ approach is useful in drawing attention to the idea of struc-
tural power in energy transitions, the considerable resources of large
corporate actors, and their close relationships with policy makers.
However, there is some ambiguity as to whether incumbents will ne-
cessarily dominate policy formulation, and will therefore always suc-
ceed in resisting changes that threaten them. While the framework is
not inconsistent with the idea that corporate actors may fail to capture
the policy process, much of the discussion, especially of British elec-
tricity policy ([20]: 28–35), appear to assume the inevitability of its
success.
Other accounts, such as Mitchell [44], and indeed later work by
Geels himself [23,41] suggest a more nuanced and dynamic view,
where incumbents do not simply resist but rather seek to shape change,
gradually reorienting the regime by adapting but maintaining a high
degree of influence, if not control. In this context, the CM might be
understood as an instance of incumbents engaging in ‘defensive in-
stitutional work’ [41,53], while at the same time seeking to shape the
development of new institutions for low carbon energy in the wider
EMR.
It is thus clear first that regime actors will not always simply resist
change, and second that a fully deterministic interpretation of the
structural power of regime actors is not convincing; as ([67]: 362) puts
it, ‘Structural analysis explains the possible; historical analysis explains
the actual’. This suggests the need for an approach in which the effects
of structural power by corporate actors in any one case, such as the CM,
are seen as explicitly contingent on the conditions for the deployment of
that power. We need to look at exactly why and how incumbents sought
to shape policy, i.e. the details of the ‘enactment’ of regime resistance or
maintenance [23], and what determined success or failure.
A useful approach to this unpacking of regime resistance is to look
at the interplay between interests, institutions and ideas, as developed
by Kern [31] in a study of low-carbon innovation organisations and by
Bell and Hindmoor in their work on structural power in finance policy
3 See Kern [31] for an exception.
4 A similar set of concepts (although using a different terminology) is to be
found in the field theory used by Hess [24] and Kungl [30].
5 Rosenbloom [51] gives an account of an ultimately unsuccessful attempt by
incumbents to deploy such discourses to oppose coal phase-out in Ontario.
6 See also Smink et al. [53], who draw on the concept of ‘corporate political
activities’ in the strategic management literature, defined as ‘corporate attempts
to shape government policy in ways favourable to the firm’ (Hillman et al 2004:
838).
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[6,7]. These authors focus on how the interests of incumbents are
constructed, and how ideas are deployed by those actors in the process
of policy development. For corporate actors, the literature suggests that
the construction of interests will emerge not only from material factors,
such as assets, but also from sometimes complex internal processes that
can differ across companies quite considerably according to internal
organisation, often giving rise to different specific corporate cultures or
world views [40,63], and differing degrees of commitment to existing
ideas within the regime [60].
Kern [31] also analyses how far existing institutions (and the
dominant discourses underlying them) constrain or facilitate the
emergence of new policy ideas. For Bell and Hindmoor [7], the focus is
on the institutional arrangements that facilitate access to decision ma-
kers by powerful corporate actors. The (somewhat common sense)
conclusion emerging from studies like these is that incumbents will be
more successful in pursuing their interests through the deployment of
ideas where the institutional landscape is more supportive.
In this study of the CM we also adopt this approach. We examine the
construction of interests of potential incumbent corporate actors, the
institutional context for their relationship with decision makers, and
the ideational strategies that they deployed in relation to those decision
makers. The overall aim is to assess what evidence there is that decision
makers internalised the ideas and interests of incumbent firms, and
what role the institutional context for influence played.
A final conceptual issue concerns the issue of ‘incumbency’ in the
case of energy regimes. As Lowes et al. [39] point out, the concept of
incumbency has been used widely in the literature on socio-technical
transitions without a clear, rigorous definition. Their view is that an
incumbent is:
‘…currently active in the socio-technical system or a part thereof
and therefore likely to be or have been involved in unsustainable
practices. Incumbents have the economic, social or technological
capacity to influence system change.’ ([39]: 32)7
The most essential part of this definition lies in the capability of
existing actors to influence change (including resisting it) through strategic
action. Such action includes not only Schumpeterian market responses,
but also the shaping of policies and rules that protect the interests of
incumbents and entrench their market dominance.
Here, whether or not large existing companies in the energy sector
undertake such actions successfully is the topic of study, so we cannot
make a prior assumption that these companies are actually incumbents
in this sense; rather they can be identified as such only through the
research process itself. Nevertheless, it is still possible at the outset to
identify a set of actors that one can plausibly expect to act as incum-
bents, which we do below in Section 5.1. We can say that actors can be
identified as potential incumbents in a particular context only if two
conditions are true. First, they must have the power to act strategically
(e.g. that they have access to decision-makers, to resources and cap-
abilities for effective lobbying, or for strategic market dominance, that
they are large enough to benefit from economies of scale etc.). Second,
they must have interests for strategic action in that context (e.g. sunk
investments they wish to protect). Consistent with our approach to
incumbency, we would see it as a context specific feature (companies
may act as incumbents in some situations but not others) and of course
their interests may change over time.
3. Methodology
The focus here is on the politics of development of a specific policy,
and so a case study approach with a focus on process was adopted as the
appropriate methodological choice.8 We draw on methods developed in
the process-tracing literature (e.g. [5,8]), which seeks to identify causal
mechanisms that produce outcomes through identifying specific entities
at each stage of a causal chain, along with activities that these entities
undertake [[5]: 46–47]. Within this approach, the focus here is speci-
fically on theory-testing, as opposed to building new theories or iden-
tifying a minimally sufficient explanation of a particular outcome.
In this case, arising from the theoretical discussion above, the en-
tities we are interested in are large corporate actors (hypothesised as
incumbents) and senior decision makers (politicians and officials),
while the activities include networking, the transfer of ideas and the
deployment of corporate resources for influence in various forms in-
cluding lobbying.
In the process-tracing approach, some care is also given to the for-
mation of evidence, defined as observations or raw data which is then
assessed for accuracy and interpreted in context. Unlike extended case
studies in the ethnographic tradition, a participant observation ap-
proach was not possible here. Instead, we use evidence from a range of
different sources, but two of these are particularly important:
• Interviews with individuals who had participated in decision making
in the CM policy process, who had been in corporations commu-
nicating with decision makers, or who had been close observers,
focusing on the issues arising from the theoretical discussion above,
i.e. construction of interests, institutional context and ideational
strategies (see Annex 1 for details). There is some sensitivity about
the topic of corporate influence, with both corporate and govern-
ment interviewees having an incentive to deny or play down the
possibility that it occurred, as noted above. We attempted to address
this problem by using interview schedules that did not ask direct
questions about lobbying, but it is still a possibility that government
and corporate interviewees played down the role it played.
Interviewees with independent observers are a useful source of tri-
angulation here, but whereas their evidence may not be biased, it
may also be less accurate, as such observers were not always present
in discussions between decision makers and corporate actors, nor
did they participate directly in the formulation of policy. It should
be borne in mind that the events being studied occurred mainly in
the period from the late 2000s up to 2014, whereas the interviews
were undertaken during 2016–18, and the memories of inter-
viewees, especially about timing and sequencing of events, may not
always be accurate. As a result other, especially documentary, forms
of evidence are important [64].• Consultation documents and submissions. As described below, there
were a number of points in the evolution of the CM where the
government published consultation documents for policy options,
and where actors then sent in submissions giving their views. In
particular we draw on submissions to the December 2010 EMR
consultation [14] and the July 2011 consultation on the Capacity
Market [15].9 We also draw on submissions and oral evidence given
to the 2011 inquiry on the EMR conducted by the House of Com-
mons Energy and Climate Change Committee [18].
In addition, the paper also draws on a range of other sources in-
cluding records of meetings between corporate and other actors with
Ministers, speeches and statements by participants and observers,
especially politicians and corporate CEOs, and media reports.
7 This is not dissimilar from another recent approach by Johnstone et al. [28].
8 Process tracing adopts a realist ontology and arguably differs from earlier
(footnote continued)
ethnographic extended case study approaches (e.g. [10]) which placed greater
emphasis on reflexivity and inter-subjectivity.
9 These responses can be found at: https://www.gov.uk/government/
consultations/electricity-market-reform and https://www.gov.uk/
government/consultations/possible-models-for-a-capacity-mechanism respec-
tively.
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4. The origins of the capacity market
In the late 2000s, UK government commitments to decarbonise and
to promote renewable electricity became more serious, with the adop-
tion of the 2008 Climate Change Act and the 2009 EU Renewables
Directive. At the same time, the governing Labour party had reversed its
earlier stance on nuclear and was keen to see new plants built ([44]:
105–115). Responding to government signalling, all the Big Six com-
panies were involved in one of the competing nuclear new build con-
sortia.10 However, new nuclear power could not be supported by the
Renewables Obligation, and a specific subsidy would be ruled out under
State Aid rules. Both government and industry therefore had an interest
in a support mechanism that could be framed as being for ‘low carbon’
generation.
The result was a set of policies known as the Electricity Market
Reform (EMR), developed over the period 2009–2013.11 The EMR in-
volved four elements: support for ‘low carbon’ electricity; a plant-level
Emissions Performance Standard for greenhouse gas emissions; a
Carbon Price Support for allowances in the EU Emissions Trading
Scheme, and a Capacity Market.
Wholesale electricity markets can take many forms, but the simplest
is the ‘energy-only’ market, where generators are offered payment only
on the basis of the energy (e.g. MWh) they can provide. Generators will
tend to bid into such markets only when prices exceed their short-run
cost of generation. Those with higher costs (typically those requiring
fuels, such as coal or gas) are able to recover their long-term costs
(including repayment of debt) only when prices peak during periods of
high demand. The classic argument for a capacity mechanism is
therefore based on a potential ‘missing money’ problem in energy-only
markets where regulators place caps on peak pricing, meaning that
potential investors fear that they may not be able to recover sufficient
revenue to cover their long-run costs [29].
However, much of the debate in the case of the Capacity Market was
actually about a new fear of ‘missing markets’ ([46]: 66) resulting from
uncertainty created by high levels of variable renewables leading to
reduced and more volatile wholesale prices, and so a collapse in in-
vestment in conventional generation capacity [11]. As both renewables
and new nuclear had frameworks of support in the EMR, the argument
was that conventional thermal capacity needed for back-up, especially
combined-cycle gas turbine (CCGT) plants, would also need a support
policy.
It is important to note that was no clear consensus amongst econ-
omists regarding capacity interventions. The International Energy
Agency ([27]: 97) noted the ‘intense academic debate’ between ad-
vocates of energy-only markets and capacity markets. Within the UK
electricity industry, attempts to develop a common position had his-
torically been unsuccessful ([48]: 297). Equally, there was no model
that dominated in real-world electricity markets, with some jurisdic-
tions having energy-only markets, some having capacity payments and
some using capacity markets [4,57]. In Britain the market itself had
moved between a capacity payment system from 1989 to 2001, and
then to an energy-only between 2001 and 2014. The decision to adopt a
Capacity Market cannot therefore simply be ascribed to a well-estab-
lished theoretical consensus and a convergence in policy practice
around the world.
5. The politics of the Capacity Market
The development of the CM took place over a period of approxi-
mately five years. In this study we focus on two key early decisions that
were fundamental to the eventual policy. The first of these was the
decision to develop any type of capacity intervention at all. The main shift
appeared to happen between early 2010, when a mechanism was not on
the immediate agenda, and the end of 2011 when the decision to in-
troduce a capacity market was formally announced. A second key de-
cision point was about the design of intervention. Throughout 2010 and
most of 2011 the government's preferred option was an approach
known as ‘strategic reserve’, but by the time the policy was announced
at the end of 2011 this had abandoned in favour of a ‘market-wide’
approach. These processes are explored in Sections 5.2 and 5.3 re-
spectively, but first we examine the key regime actors, their interests
and their inter-relationships.
5.1. Regime actors and networks
In Section 2 above, we argued that potential incumbents could be
identified as those companies that had both the power to strategically
influence policy and interests in doing so. Here, we argue that two
groups of companies in the British electricity regime meet these criteria
in relation to the development of the CM. The first is the ‘Big Six’12
companies which are vertically integrated in electricity generation and
supply. Their generation portfolios were dominated by fossil-fuel
thermal capacity, split fairly evenly between gas- and coal-fired capa-
city, but with Centrica and EDF also having significant nuclear assets
(Fig. 1).
While the Big Six were the most visible and powerful corporate
actors, there was also a group of ‘second tier’ electricity companies,
which included members of the Independent Generators Group
(International Power, DONG UK, Eggborough Power Ltd, Drax Power
Ltd, InterGen, and ConocoPhillips), and ESB International. These
companies were also heavily invested in thermal fossil fuel capacity
(Fig. 2).
Between them, the Big Six and the second tier generators owned
96% of British electricity generating capacity in 2012, and 94% of
fossil-fuel thermal generation [9]. Since the bulk of their sunk invest-
ments were in existing capacity, these companies could be expected to
have an interest in a policy intervention that would reward them simply
for holding such assets. This is especially the case for coal-fired plants
since the costs of maintaining these were increasing (and to a degree
uncertain) under EU Directives for local pollution reduction,13 whilst
free allocations within the EU emissions trading scheme were to end
from 2013.
However, while a majority of Big Six and second-tier generating
companies were in favour of the introduction of a capacity mechanism
in the December 2010 EMR Consultation, four companies (E.On, RWE,
ESB International and DONG UK) were opposed (Table 1).
Some observers and corporate participants argue that opposition to
a capacity mechanism was linked to recent and on-going investment in
new CCGT plants.14 Revenue for older gas-fired plants would be heavily
dependent on peak pricing and so more exposed to uncertainty with
increasing renewables. Companies with such plants could therefore be
expected to be in favour of a capacity intervention. Conversely those
who were building or had recently built new CCGT would seek to run
these at base load, and might be expected to be less supportive. There is
some evidence to support this view, since the four companies opposed
10 Interviews 1 and 4. The consortia consisted of: E.ON and RWE seeking to
build two plants at Wylfa on Anglesey and Oldbury near Bristol; EDF and
Centrica also seeking to build two plants at Hinkley Point in Somerset and
Sizewell in Suffolk, and SSE and Iberdrola (owner of Scottish Power) together
with GDF Suez seeking to build one plant in Cumbria.
11 https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/electricity/wholesale-market/market-
efficiency-review-and-reform/electricity-market-reform-emr.
12 The generation arms of these companies are: Centrica, EDF Energy, E.On,
RWE, Scottish and Southern Energy and Scottish Power.
13 i.e. the 2001 Large Combustion Plant Directive and the 2010 Industrial
Emissions Directive.
14 Interview 3, [[9]: 3].
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to a capacity mechanism in 2010 all had large investments (relative to
their portfolios) in new CCGT plants, whereas most of the others did not
[17,9]. It is also possible that distinctive corporate cultures played some
role in the different positions of companies. In particular, the senior
management of RWE in the UK appeared particularly committed to the
idea of making energy markets work without intervention, and there
were similar views at E.On.15
The other central regime actor was the Department of Energy and
Climate Change (DECC), where the EMR policy process was located.
The detailed policy development of the CM was carried out by officials,
while Ministers were engaged with the broad outlines of the EMR, and
on high-profile issues such as support for new nuclear power. Public
concern over this period focused more on high energy prices, which as a
result also occupied much political attention. However, while public
awareness of the CM was low, it is clear that there was a powerful
underlying political driver for senior decision makers to maintain
electricity system security. In the words of a senior official:
‘The thing you've got to remember…is, about all of us actually, not
Fig. 1. Big Six generating portfolios, 2012.
Source: [17].
Fig. 2. Selected second-tier company generating portfolios, 2012.
Source: [17].
Table 1
Position of corporate actors on capacity intervention in 2010 EMR consultation.
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/electricity-market-reform.
In favour of capacity intervention Opposed to capacity intervention
Big Six Centrica, EDF, SSE, Scottish Power E.ON, RWE
Second-tier generators International Power, Drax, InterGen, ConocoPhillips ESB International, DONG
15 Interview 3
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just Ministers…Ministers and officials… there is one thing that is
going to get you fired, and that is this [lights going out]. So to some
extent price is a political problem, but we would all be clearing our
desks if…’16
Throughout this period, large generating companies had contact
with decision makers through a number of routes. Ministers had formal
meetings with senior representatives from the Big Six and the second-
tier generating companies, although they also met with representatives
of many other organisations and companies.17 Probably more im-
portant for the Big Six were the opportunities for informal discussion
arranged through the UK Business Council for Sustainable Energy
(UKBCSE), an organisation originally founded in 2001 which evolved
into a forum for chief executives from the Big Six and National Grid to
meet both amongst themselves and with senior figures in government.18
By the mid-2000s, it was the most important energy industry forum for
discussion of policy, and a number of interviewees identified it as
having a key role in contacts between the Big Six and DECC.19 The
UKBCSE hosted regular informal dinners with the Secretary of State and
Permanent Secretary,20 as well as meetings with lower-level officials. It
also provided an important coordinating arena for companies to discuss
and collate their positions on the EMR, with a working group and an
EMR strategy day for senior staff in the autumn of 2010.21 The second
tier electricity generators also had their own association, the In-
dependent Generators Group, which while it had less access than the
UKBCSE, played an important role in coordinating company efforts to
influence government.
5.2. Deciding to have a capacity intervention
The first key decision was that to introduce a capacity mechanism of
some sort. Debates about the potential effects of renewables growth on
investment in other generating plants and resulting capacity margins
began to emerge in the late 2000s. In March 2010, the view of the
government was still that the existing energy-only market price signals
would be adequate to bring forward the investment needed ([25]:
12–13). However, following the general election in May 2010, a new
Conservative-Liberal Coalition government came to power. According
to a close observer, a core driver for the Coalition was that ‘We're the
government for action’ in comparison with the previous administration:
‘…in the new government, politically, at that time there was a sense
that the discussion had previously been theoretical and it now be-
cause more practical and more immediate…So when Coalition
government politicians came in they instructed DECC officials to get
on with it.’22
There is also some evidence that decision makers were becoming
increasingly concerned about a capacity crunch at this point. Over the
autumn of 2010, as officials prepared an EMR Consultation document,
they commissioned new modelling on expected capacity margins out to
the mid-2020s [50]. This modelling differed from a previous exercise in
2009 [13], in that it showed a sharp fall in the capacity margin in the
late 2010s under the existing energy-only market. The reason for the
difference appears to be that assumptions about the effects of closures
of coal-fired and oil-fired plants under the EU Directive on Industrial
Emissions were included in the 2010 projections but not earlier mod-
elling.
These results formed part of the context for officials and politicians.
However, it is also clear that decisions were not based purely on
quantified risks from modelling, but were also strongly influenced by
the basic uncertainties in predicting demand and capacity in a priva-
tised market and the fear of the political consequences of the downside
risk. According to a senior official involved in the process:
‘...how do you make sense of the economic analysis around this?
Security of supply is a particular problem, because the numbers are
geared, and so you divide one number by the other. And so if you
imagine you've got 100 units of demand, and you've got 120 units of
supply, you've got a nice comfortable 20% capacity margin. Your
advice to Ministers would be: “There's some risk here, you can never
get rid of all risk, but that's pretty comfortable”…But it doesn't take
many units of demand to go up, let's say you're out by 5% on de-
mand, which is not impossible three or four years out, in fact its
highly likely. You are one or two stations worth, ten units are out
because you haven't understood what the economics of individual
plants are…whatever it is, you can end up fairly quickly in a world
where you've got 110 over 105, and suddenly you've got a really big
security of supply problem.’23
Politicians in the newly elected government had the same concerns;
according to a political adviser in DECC, ‘Chris Huhne [the Secretary of
State] would always ask about the lights going out.’24 However, in late
2010 Ministers were not yet too worried, and it appears that a capacity
intervention was seen at this stage a more of an insurance policy:
‘…views on this [capacity adequacy] definitely changed over time,
but not as early as winter 2010. It was not a major part of the
narrative. Maybe more in 2011. But overall this rose incrementally
as an issue, rather than a big shift…The capacity market was always
talked about as a backstop measure. In discussions early on, the idea
was to take powers in case we needed them.’25
In December 2010 the Coalition government published its EMR
Consultation document, which proposed a capacity intervention ([14]:
31–32). The majority of generating companies responded by supporting
the government's proposal, and their submissions generally echoed and
amplified the arguments for it made in the consultation document. Most
submissions focused on the idea that an anticipated increase in inter-
mittent renewable generation would create revenue uncertainty, so that
existing energy-only market arrangements would not be sufficient for
future investment in generating capacity, and lead to a capacity crunch
[68–73]. The implicit threat of an ‘investment strike’ was perhaps
stated most clearly in InterGen's submission:
‘InterGen can only commit to continuing to invest in the UK if the
outcome of the EMR allows us to do so… even if capacity margins
are tight, InterGen's planned UK projects will be unable to obtain
finance…to support their construction unless a capacity mechanism
for flexible generation is introduced.’
([74]: 1)
These companies drew on a modelling exercise on the effects of
wind intermittency on markets that had been commissioned from the
consultancy firm Pöyry in July 2009 [49] on behalf of Centrica, DONG,
EirGrd, ESBI, National Grid and Renewable Energy Systems, and which
compared the British energy-only market unfavourably with the Irish
market which did have capacity payments.
16 Interview 5
17 For details see: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/
20130102164008/http:/www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/accesstoinform/
registers/ministermtgs/ministermtgs.aspx
18 According to a close observer, in one early event, a Minister observed that
it had been years since he had seen all of the Big Six chief executives together in
a meeting (Interview 9)
19 Interviews 1 and 6
20 Interview 7
21 Interview 1
22 Interview 7. See also Huhne [26].
23 Interview 5
24 Interview 2
25 Interview 2. See also comments by Chris Huhne to the Energy and Climate
Change Committee in early 2011 ([18]: Ev 116).
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Despite acknowledging that the capacity margin in 2010 was still
generous, a number of companies pressed for immediate action to get a
mechanism in place [75,73,69].26 Over this period the generating
companies continued to meet with Ministers, with Chris Huhne meeting
RWE, EdF, SSE, the IGG and Centrica (twice) between January and June
2011, and Energy Minister Charles Hendry meeting SSE and Centrica
again twice.27
A minority of the large generators were opposed to the proposal for
an intervention, arguing that the case had not yet been made, and that
if relatively minor reforms were undertaken to sharpen price incentives
in the energy-only market then sufficient investment would be forth-
coming [76–79]. Reservations about a capacity mechanism were also
expressed by a number of actors who, while not necessarily part of a
‘core regime alliance’, were politically important, including the Con-
federation of British Industry, GE Energy, and the centre-right think-
tank Policy Exchange [18], as well as National Grid [45].
Nevertheless, when the government published the follow up to the
EMR Consultation, in the form of the July 2011 White Paper, Planning
our Electric Future, it interpreted the state of this debate as showing ‘a
broad consensus that current market arrangements will not deliver the
scale of long-term investment needed’ ([15]: 6), and re-stated the
missing money and impact of intermittent renewables arguments (ibid:
66–67). The White Paper confirmed the proposal to legislate for a new
capacity mechanism (ibid: 9).
5.3. From a strategic reserve to a market-wide capacity mechanism
At this point the debate about whether there would be a capacity
mechanism or not was effectively over, and the focus shifted to the
particular form that it would take. In the 2010 Consultation document
the proposal was for ‘targeted payments to encourage security of
supply’ ([14]: 6), in which a central body would procure a relatively
small volume of new capacity through a competitive process, which
would then be withheld from the wholesale electricity market and
despatched only when prices rose above a certain level. This is gen-
erally known as a ‘Strategic Reserve’ (SR).
As shown in Fig. 3, the SR option is distinct from ‘market-wide’
approaches, in which contracted capacity is not withheld from the
market, and so can earn both payments for capacity and for generation
as normal. There are several possible variants of market-wide me-
chanisms, including the capacity auction which was eventually chosen
later in the process.
Companies with existing generation assets could be expected to
prefer a market-wide mechanism, since an SR approach would mainly
benefit new plants. Owners of existing plants would not only miss out
on capacity payments, but would also suffer from suppression of peak
prices in the wholesale market. A market-wide mechanism could also be
expected to reduce peak prices, but the resulting risk of lower market
revenues would be offset by the higher chance of winning capacity
payments available to much greater range of market participants. In the
view of one observer, a preference for a market-wide design was ‘ab-
solutely a commercial no-brainer.’28
Some of the major generators started to lobby on this aspect of
design early on. Scottish Power, Centrica and the IGG were all strong
supporters of the market-wide approach and met with ministers over
the autumn of 2010. According to one close observer, the IGG:
‘...said…that they had a meeting with the minister, at which they
huffed and puffed about capacity mechanism, being targeted rather
than market wide. And the minister said “Well OK, send me a paper
which explains why market wide is the right thing to do”.’29
The IGG subsequently commissioned a critical assessment of the SR
option and to make the argument for a market wide approach, which
they then sent to the government [80]. In their submissions to the EMR
Consultation document, a clear majority of the Big Six and the IGG were
opposed to the SR (Table 2).
In making their case against the SR approach, companies focused on
what is referred to as the ‘slippery slope’ problem
[76,71,81,69,78,79,74,72], Drax [2010]. This is summarised in ([72]:
13) as follows:
‘With the potential for significant volumes of centrally-tendered
plant [i.e. a Strategic Reserve]…market-based investment would be
sterilised. Developers would be concerned that if they did invest this
would be “crowded-out” by tendered plant and hence would hold
back investment or may even strategically defer investment in the
hope of securing a tender...This would all lead to a “slippery slope” –
where an increasing amount of plant is tendered for and the role of
the market is eroded.’
This argument was also made by a number of Big Six CEOs in the
House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Select Committee en-
quiry on EMR ([18]: Ev 49-50) and in speeches (e.g. [12]).
A second argument made by some companies was that a targeted
approach would not provide sufficient volume of despatchable capacity
to ensure system security at times of high demand and low wind output,
especially in winter during meteorological high pressure events that
could last several days (e.g. [71,69,81]).
As with intervention in general, there were a few dissenting voices
amongst the generating companies, especially ESB International, RWE
and DONG. Their view was that the SR was the lesser of two evils as it
would be less distorting for the wholesale market, especially if it were
made clear that an SR mechanism would be used as a last resort at a
very high price. Some companies were also sceptical about the volume
argument against the SR, because of the scope for demand response by
consumers from 2020 onwards and the possibility of using existing
back-up plant sited at hospitals, water companies etc., which were
currently under-utilised [77].
In July 2011, an EMR White Paper again put forward the SR as a
preferred option, but included a number of proposed remedies, in-
cluding clear despatch rules, to address the slippery slope issue ([15]:
166–167). However, in their responses most of the Big Six and second-
tier generating companies dismissed these proposed remedies and
Fig. 3. Possible models for a capacity mechanism
Source: ([15]: 164).
26 This call for urgency was also made by senior managers in Big Six firms
appearing before the Energy and Climate Change Select Committee in the
spring of 2011 ([18]: Ev 47-51).
27 http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130102164008/http:/
www.decc.gov.uk/en/content/cms/accesstoinform/registers/ministermtgs/
ministermtgs.aspx
28 Interview 7 29 Interview 7
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repeated the arguments made earlier ([82,68,83,73,84–87]).
In December 2011, the government announced that it would now
choose a market-wide approach, and a Capacity Market in particular
([16]: 22). The decision was taken despite the fact that the govern-
ment's own cost-benefit analysis consistently supported the SR ap-
proach, a point that was later criticised by observers [3,62].
The slippery slope argument clearly had an influence on the deci-
sion. It was cited in the Technical Update ([16]: 29), and in the words of
a senior official:
‘…the intervention was considered to be an insurance policy in a
comfortable world that suddenly looked like it was going to be
under more pressure given the new analysis, and I think given that
analysis, the slippery slope argument felt much more compel-
ling...’30
However, it appears that the government had also become in-
creasingly concerned about the volume argument, with that concern
symbolised by the idea of an extended winter anti-cyclone with low
wind generation and high demand. A senior advisor in DECC recalled
that the decision to go for a market-wide design:
‘…was also about scale; if this was a small requirement, a strategic
reserve makes sense, if a bigger issue then a market wide approach is
better… Throughout, there was concern about the infamous five still
days in January’31
At the time, this was an issue for the rather distant future; in 2011
wind provided less than 4% of total electricity generated. The chal-
lenges of large swings in wind output were expected to materialise only
from the mid-2020s. The basis in 2011 for understanding how frequent
and extended such events were likely to be was fairly crude, as it is only
more recently that meteorologists have started to undertake reanalysis
of longer-term data (e.g. [58]).
However, the wider context for this concern was that from early
2011 onwards, the government began to come under increasing pres-
sure from the large generators, and especially the Big Six, to get a ca-
pacity mechanism in place urgently. The capacity margin in the early
2010s was actually high by recent historical standards. The glut in
capacity, together with relatively high gas prices, meant that the eco-
nomics of gas-fired power generation was very difficult, and over the
early 2010s a number of plants were mothballed or closed. It is clear
that some companies used these closures to signal the possibility of a
future capacity crunch and the urgency of signals for new investment,
effectively reminding government of its structural dependency in rela-
tion to electricity supply. At the end of June 2011, just ahead of the
publication of the EMR White Paper the CEO of Centrica, Sam Laidlaw,
gave a speech (widely covered in the media) in which he claimed that:
‘The clock is ticking. In my view, we as a nation have got one year in
which to take action, or our carbon reduction targets may have to be
sacrificed in the interests of safeguarding the security of our energy
supplies.’32
The pressure continued through 2012 and 2013, with companies
calling for a speeding up of the policy and for the CM to be established
as quickly as possible. While the basis for this pressure was challenged
(described as ‘scaremongering’ by Pollitt, quoted in [59]) the steady
stream of warnings put enormous pressure on the government, and
placed the focus on capacity rather than flexibility.
6. Conclusion and implications
Give the evidence presented in Section 5, how far can we say that
decision makers internalised the ideas and interests of incumbent firms,
and that the Capacity Market an instance of regime resistance? Firstly,
it is clear that the British government did have a structural dependency
on the large energy corporates, inasmuch as senior decision makers
themselves perceived that they had a strong political incentive to ‘keep
the lights on’, which provided leverage for corporates framing their
commercial interests in terms of security of supply.
Second, there is clear evidence that the large generators were very
active in their lobbying of government. In this lobbying they deployed
both ideas and resources. A majority of the large generators pressed for
a capacity intervention, through a diverse set of routes including con-
sultations, private meetings, commissioned modelling and public
statements. They deployed ideas – notably about ‘missing money’ and
the effects of more variable renewables – in which they emphasised the
public, rather than their own commercial, interest. On the issue of
whether the intervention should be in the form of a Strategic Reserve or
a market-wide mechanism, a majority of large generators lobbied for a
market-wide approach, through a similar set of routes. They deployed
ideas, notably the ‘slippery slope’ and the volume arguments, which
again they framed in terms of the public good. Throughout the period
from 2011 onwards, the large generators also built up pressure on the
government to deliver a capacity mechanism quickly through the
creation of a sense of urgency through statements about plant closures
and a looming capacity crunch.
Third Big Six generators were both well-coordinated and benefitted
from an unusually good opportunity for influence through informal
senior level contacts with ministers and officials in the form of the UK
Business Council for Sustainable Energy.
Did the government make these decisions because of this lobbying,
i.e. because decision makers had internalised the interests and ideas of
corporates? It is hard to prove causality – i.e. a ‘smoking gun’ test [5] –
in part precisely because corporate actors made arguments for inter-
ventions in terms of the public interest, especially security of supply, for
which decision makers also had an independent political incentive. In
the absence of evidence for a smoking gun, another approach to judging
Table 2
Big Six and second-tier generator positions on the principle and form of capacity intervention in responses to 2010 EMR Consultation.
Source: https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/electricity-market-reform.
Preferred form of intervention
Market-wide Strategic Reserve None
In favour Centrica, EdF, SSE, Scottish Power, Intergen, International Power,
Drax
RWE, ESB International
Opposed DONG, E.On Centrica, EdF, SSE, Scottish Power, Intergen, International Power,
Drax
30 Interview 5
31 Interview 2. Senior government views may have been influenced a parti-
cularly cold period with low wind output in the winter of 2010 ([45]: 38). The
Energy Minister at the time, Charles Hendry, told the Energy and Climate
Change Committee in the spring of 2011 that: ‘I think that what we learned
from the period before December, when it was so cold and the wind was not
blowing very much, is that the great challenge for us in this decade is how we
move from the power being available when the resource is there to the power
being available when the consumer needs it.’ ECCC ([18]: Ev 116).
32 Speech to the Economist energy summit, 23 June 2011, https://www.
centrica.com/news/centrica-calls-honest-debate-uk-energy-security
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the unique necessity of a factor in a causal chain is counterfactual
analysis [36]. In this case this would mean considering what would
have happened to the development of the CM had incumbents not
lobbied.
On the basis of the evidence presented here we argue that it is
possible that a capacity mechanism would still have been adopted.
Incoming ministers in May 2010 were driven by the desire to be seen as
a government of action, ahead of meetings and submissions from
companies. They also seem to have been influenced by their own
modelling of resource adequacy in the late 2010s and a desire, driven
by political incentives, to err on the side of caution. The views of a
majority of the large generators reinforced a position the government
had already taken at the end of 2010.
By contrast, there was a clear shift in the government position over
the course of 2011 on the design of an intervention, from Strategic
Reserve to a market-wide approach. There is evidence that decision
makers were influenced by the ‘slippery slope’ argument put forward by
corporate actors, but in the end they seem to have been swayed more by
the volume argument. Here it is more likely that lobbying played a
direct causal role in the decision, and in its absence it is plausible that
the original Strategic Reserve approach would have prevailed.
In several ways, the Capacity Market does therefore look like an
example of ‘regime resistance’. In particular it has propped up the ex-
isting assets of the large generating companies at the heart of the re-
gime, which have been shown in this case to be acting as incumbents.
While the government apparently hoped that the policy would lead to
the construction of new gas plants, and demand side response ag-
gregators early on hoped that it would help develop their industry, in
fact the vast majority of rewards have gone to existing capacity.
However, there are also aspects of the CM story that are not so well
accommodated within a simple regime resistance framework. One is the
fact that the large generators were not a single bloc. Amongst both the
Big Six and the IGG there were a minority of companies who defined
their interests as opposed to a capacity intervention and to a market-
wide approach, and who lobbied for these positions but failed to in-
fluence government sufficiently to secure what they wanted. The dif-
ferences between this group of companies and the majority did not arise
because of interests in emerging technological niches, but rather was
due to their different investments within the regime.
Second, while the institutional context for provided by the UKBCSE
was particularly conducive to influence, it is important to recognise that
it was specific to its time, ending in 2012. Its successor organisation,
EnergyUK, has a larger membership and does not provide the same
opportunities for close coordination of a small number of senior cor-
porate managers and decision makers.
We would argue that our findings have implications for the wider
study of energy transitions. One is the importance of understanding the
interests of actors as specific and constructed. From a methodological
point of view, this implies that studies of changes in energy regimes
should pay attention to and provide evidence for how interests are
constructed, as in this work and similar studies (e.g. [31]). Sub-
stantively, it also emphasises the importance of allowing for di-
vergences of interest amongst actors within energy regimes; the con-
cepts of a ‘core alliance’ and a ‘stable and hegemonic “historical bloc”’
[20] need to be unpacked. The methodological point and the sub-
stantive point are related; without detailed evidence on interest con-
struction, broad brush analysis is more likely to assume that incumbents
are all alike.
Another implication relates to how ‘ideas’ or ‘discourses’ are seen
within analyses of energy transitions. Here, we saw that incumbents
deployed different types of ideas, at different levels (and arguably with
different audiences in mind). Specific ideas relating to the details of
policy (for example ‘missing money’ and ‘slippery slope’) were deployed
for officials, whereas the idea that there was a looming capacity
shortage in which the lights might ‘go out’ was deployed to the public
(and ultimately to politicians) via the media. Within Kingdon's [33]
multiple streams framework, this might also be seen as incumbents
being active in both the ‘problem’ and ‘policy’ streams (see also Kern
and Rogge [32]).
Distinctions like this point to the need for a conceptual schema that
goes beyond a single notion of ‘idea’ or ‘discourse’. For example,
[65,66] usefully distinguishes between types of ideas according to
whether they are in the foreground or background of debate, and
whether they are cognitive ideas (such as those used in policy debates)
or normative ideas (intended to galvanise action). The study of transi-
tions, and in particular, the action of incumbents within change, would
benefit from the wider use of such distinctions.
In the literature on the use of ideas in policy change, the conditions
under which such use is likely to have greater or lesser effect is of
central interest. Kern [31] argues that the ‘room to manoeuvre’ in
processes of policy change is constrained by existing institutions, both
by their practices they engender and by the background ideas (what
Campbell (1998) would call ‘paradigms’) that typically support in-
stitutions. He goes on to say that ‘New storylines also face difficulties
when they challenge dominant discourses that have been embedded in
powerful formal, institutional arrangements.’ ([31]: 1129). The notion
of deep-seated dominant discourses [20] preventing the emergence of
new ideas in transitions is a central part of the ‘regime’ idea, as well as
in framework such as Unruh's [61] ‘techno-institutional complex’.
Here, however, the picture was more complex, as there was no
single dominant institutional discourse or paradigm, but rather several,
competing for traction. The market-led paradigm has played a central
role in UK energy policy thinking since the 1980s (Rutledge 2010), and
despite claims of paradigm change (Helm 2005), is still regularly used
as a principle. The minority view amongst the Big Six and the IGG fell
firmly within this paradigm, i.e. that energy-only markets should be left
alone to do their work, but despite this it did not prevail. This was
because an alternative idea, that system security would be threatened
by a surge in variable renewables, proved ultimately to be more pow-
erful. This situation of relative fluidity is a reminder of Blyth's (2002)
basic point that ideas are particularly important under conditions of
uncertainty, particularly relevant once energy transitions have been
embarked upon. But it is also a reminder that in the original formula-
tion in the socio-technical approach, regimes were conceptualised as
sets of rules or ideas that were only semi-coherent [22]. Keeping this in
view is important for not over-estimating the inevitability of lock-in
[61] and the coherence of dominant discourse coalitions [20].
Given the analysis of the Capacity Market presented here, what can
be done? Is it possible to mitigate regime resistance, structural de-
pendency of government and capture by incumbents in the process of
energy transition? We argue that what is needed to address these
challenges (certainly in the British context) is a radical change in the
institutional context. The Capacity Market is but one example of a
wider set of problems with governance in the energy transition in
Britain, including other examples of incumbent capture [38] and a
failure of coordination. Current governance does not complement the
technological, business and social changes underway, and change that
is occurring is often happening in spite of, rather than because of, that
governance.
The most fundamental principle is the need for an intellectual co-
ordination of energy governance, involving the development of a vision of
the future energy system, and the setting of a clear direction for policy
and regulation, through an open, transparent and legitimate process that is
independent of short-term political pressures, and not vulnerable to capture.
At the moment, Britain (and many other countries) lacks a formal
home for such a process, which is why we propose the establishment of
a new consensus-building and direction setting body (which might be
called an Energy Transformation Council or something similar). The
Committee on Climate Change cannot provide this function, as its remit
is not to take a view between different technological or social pathways;
rather it is only meant to show the various ways in which carbon
budgets can be met cost-effectively. Like the National Infrastructure
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Commission, the CCC is also ultimately a technocratic body, whereas a
body with a specific remit to set the direction of energy policy, within
boundaries of sustainability set by the CCC, would need not technical
expertise, but also input from all key social and economic con-
stituencies, somewhat like the Just Transmission Commission estab-
lished by the Scottish Government.33 However, unlike that Commission
such a body would need to be permanent, at least over the course of the
energy transition. It would need to gather formal and informal feedback
from all stakeholders operating within the energy system, and to con-
tinuously monitor and review the progress of policies. Our proposal
thus goes beyond previous calls for some form of technical Energy
Agency in the UK. There are no obvious precedents for such an ap-
proach in Britain, although there are some models elsewhere, such as
the Energy Agreement for Sustainable Growth in the Netherlands [56].
To try to avoid capture, we also argue that such a body would have
to produce a more level playing field, by proactively providing a plat-
form and analytical resources to a range of actors from outside of the
incumbents, including new entrants, NGOs and expert independents, as
part of the policy development process. This would have the effect of
increasing the amount of evidence, in ways that the government might
itself not think of, and provide a useful testing of arguments.
Radical institutional change is often resisted. However, the case of
the CM shows that conventional governance arrangements for policy
change in a case like Britain are not fit-for-purpose during major energy
system transformations.
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Appendix 1: Interviews
A number of interviews were conducted between July 2016 and January 2018 for the research underlying this paper (see Table A.1), which also
covered other aspects of the development of the Capacity Market. Interviewees were identified on the basis of their involvement or closeness to the
Capacity Market policy development process, with some identified through a snowballing process. Because the roles and expected knowledge of the
different interviewees differed, a semi-structured design approach to the interview questionnaires, balancing focus on the key issues with openness
and a tailoring of appropriate questions to respondents, was adopted [2,34]. A draft text of the analysis, involving interpretation of material from the
interviews, was sent to interviewees for confirmation [64].
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